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SCENARIOS OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION DOMINANCE AND VULNERABILITY
James J. Tritten
Scenarios can be used to help analysts and decisionmakers
think creatively about issues with which they generally feel
comfortable. They can be used to stimulate one to think more
creatively about political military affairs and the Pacific
region by fleshing out some nuclear escalation dominance and
vulnerability scenarios, setting the agenda for subseguent
discussions.
Recent examples of regional security tensions found in the
literature indicate a clear bias that there is something terribly
wrong with American declaratory strategies designed to support
deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to form the conceptual
basis for actual military operations. Much of this literature
specifically guestions the wisdom of the Navy's Maritime Strategy
and the possibility that the U.S. Navy will attack Soviet
ballistic missile submarines during the conventional phase of a
future war. Why is attacking ballistic missile submarines cast
as an American threat when Soviet spokesman have been making such
statements since at least 1962?
Attack against strategic missile-carrying submarines (often
termed "strategic antisubmarine warfare") is a most controversial
topic for those of us interested in navies, deterrence, war
fighting, war termination, and arms control. The concept
involves the cutting edge of submarine and antisubmarine warfare
technologies and techniques (hence detailed technical information
is seldom forthcoming from governments), the potential for uncon-
trolled or unwanted escalation during the conventional phase of a
war, some extremely difficult command and control issues, and a
potential new area for arms control between the superpowers.
Attacking strategic missile-carrying nuclear submarines,
however, already involves more than just the two superpowers.
First, three other nations, one a Pacific power, have such war-
ships: China, France, and the United Kingdom. Second, many
nations have existing antisubmarine forces that might be
positioned, capable, and potentially involved in military opera-
tions against the nations who have submarines carrying strategic
ballistic or cruise missiles.
Canada, for example, will apparently join those nations with
nuclear-powered submarines that will routinely deploy in the
ocean areas where strategic missile-carrying submarines operate--
although one should recognize that strategic antisubmarine war-
fare is conducted with more than nuclear-powered submarines.
Navies of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and France all support
antisubmarine warfare forces capable of strategic antisubmarine
warfare operations against missile-carrying submarines.
This prospect - of many nations potentially conducting
strategic antisubmarine warfare and thus upsetting deterrence
reinforces the Soviet concept of "equal security." The Soviet
military claims that in order to have the same level of security
as enjoyed by the United States, it must have a defensive
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capability against all possible enemies.
An interesting question to ask the Soviet military is if
their planning formula for strategic parity includes China, and
if so, how? An understanding of equal security is necessary
since increased conventional naval force deployments by
Australia, Canada and Japan made to reduce the perceived need
for American forward deployments of nuclear weapons, might serve
to heighten , rather than reduce Soviet anxieties about their
nuclear forces at sea.
Many people believe that deterrence prevents war from
erupting. Deterrence, however, is only a theory and opinions
differ as to what best deters. In general, deterrence is thought
credible when one nation is convinced that another nation has
both the capability to defend and/or punish in response to an
attack and the political will to do so.
There are three major schools of deterrence theory. The
first says that you best deter war by maintaining the capability
to passively and actively prevent an enemy from achieving his
goals and objectives. Soviet ballistic missile, air, and civil
defenses located in the Far East Theater of Military Operations
are examples of passive measures nations take to prevent damage
to their homeland. Modern Soviet offensive ballistic missiles in
Asia that can strike U.S. or allied air, submarine, or missile
bases before they can be used are examples of active "defenses"
that support this theory of deterrence.
Recent Soviet military statements support the view that the
preferred strategy for deterrence is based upon such war-fighting
concepts. For example, the current Soviet Minister of Defense
recently stated that: "As for strategic nuclear forces,
sufficiency today is determined by the ability to prevent a
nuclear strike from being launched with impunity against our
country in any situation, even the most unfavorable .
"
On the other hand, according to a recent article by Soviet
academics "...the defensive doctrine and strategy do not
envisage. . .preventing a retaliatory strike by the adversary, or
reducing the consequences of this strike to an acceptable
4level." Who are the more authoritative in matters of Soviet
military doctrine and strategy—academics or the military?
Without access to declassified military documents, readily
available to the USSR when trying to assess U.S. intentions, the
West is forced to rely on expert judgment interpreting such
conflicting statements. At a minimum, the West will need to
watch the views of Soviet political leaders on these issues to
resolve which group, the military or academia, speaks for the
Party.
The second major theory is that deterrence is served best by
the capability to punish an aggressor if he breaks the peace.
The latter theory is also described as a "minimal" or "assured
destruction" theory of deterrence; i.e., one need not field
sufficient forces to prevent an aggressor from damaging one's
homeland but merely a minimal force that can retaliate with
offensive forces - even if forced to absorb a first strike.
If shared by two nations, this second theory of deterrence
based upon retaliation is known as "mutual assured destruction"
or MAD. The unilateral dismantling by the U.S. of its only
ballistic missile defense site at Grand Forks, North Dakota in
the 1970s and similar U.S. actions virtually eliminating air and
civil defenses are actions compatible with "mutual" assured
destruction. Unfortunately Soviet retention and expansion of
active and passive defenses, suggests they do not accept the
assured vulnerability aspects of the "MAD" theory of deterrence.
When discussing the Soviet theory of deterrence, the former
Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Nikolai V. Ogarkov stated that "...Soviet military doctrine says
the Armed Forces must be able not only to defend the country
against a potential aggressor by countering it with passive means
and defensive tactics but also to deliver crushing counter-
attacks. .. " Such a view is not compatible with MAD theory which
assumes that nations will leave themselves essentially defense-
less against nuclear strikes.
A third school of deterrence subscribes to the philosophy
that one should maintain forces necessary to "prevent" a strike
against oneself but that in any case, adequate secure reserves
are needed to ensure retaliation if prevention is not possible.
The U.S. terms this "countervailing" strategy.
Whether one chooses prevention, minimal deterrence, MAD, or
countervailing strategy as the preferred theory of deterrence,
there is general agreement by all nuclear powers that a nation
must have a survivable/secure nuclear reserve force capable of
striking back, even if subjected to a coordinated, surprise first
strike. This reserve retaliatory force must be perceived by
the other nation as having the credible capability of a
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retaliatory strike, even after worst-case enemy actions.
Traditionally, nations have looked to navies to provide
strategic nuclear delivery systems that can survive enemy attacks
and threaten nuclear retaliation. Western strategists often argue
that it is the knowledge that, despite the relative vulnerability
of land-based missiles and the problems in penetration by air-
breathing systems, sufficient warheads remain on undetected sub-
marines at sea - a threat so powerful that no nation would risk
the first strike.
The Soviet Union fired a ballistic missile from a submarine
in 1955, well before Polaris appeared in the U.S.. Early Soviet
missiles that reguired a submarine to surface before firing were
replaced by more advanced models that could be launched from
under the sea. As sea-based ballistic missile ranges improved,
Soviet submarines did not have to close an enemy's shorelines in
order to threaten North America. Some Soviet submarines
carrying ballistic and cruise missiles have, over the years
however, continued their pattern of patrolling off the shores of
the U.S. and Canada.
The U.S. Navy's first maritime nuclear deterrent force was
Regulus cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships. As
technologies permitted, sea-launched ballistic missiles were
developed and married to submarines. The Soviet Union ignored
this shift from sea-based cruise missiles to ballistic missiles
and continued building its missile submarines capable of
launching cruise missiles against either sea or shore targets.
The SS-N-8 Sawfly sea-based ballistic missile, first
deployed by the USSR in 1972, gave them the unilateral advantage
of deploying some strategic missile submarines close to their own
shoreline while threatening targets in North America. The Soviets
argued in the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), at
the same time as they were first deploying the SS-N-8, that they
required compensation in numbers of missile submarines because
their shorter missile ranges required them to sail their
submarines long distances to forward patrol areas. SALT I gives
the Soviet Union a significant advantage in numbers of missile
submarines; indeed, the USSR has almost twice as many of these
submarines as the rest of the world combined. The advantage in
numbers of submarine hulls is realized once one attempts to plan
campaigns to attack all of them.
Submarines on patrol near the Soviet Union are deployed in
areas termed "bastions" by Western analysts. The term refers to
USSR home waters where the Soviet military can bring to bear
favorable geography and forces to protect their missile
submarines. There is ample literature, hardware, and exercise
evidence to support the contention that this is the preferred
g
method of Soviet deployment for the bulk of its navy.
An interesting asymmetry developed between Western and
Soviet navies. The U.S., French, and Royal Navies retained the
shorter range Polaris, Poseidon, M-20 and M-4 missiles and relied
on stealth to provide security for their ballistic missile
submarines on patrol. The Soviet Navy, on the other hand,
deployed its newer submarines in bastions, such as the Sea of
Okhotsk, with a protective array of air and sea power and
favorable geography to ensure that its forces retained their
"combat stability" (mission capability) . Implicit in the deploy-
ment of protecting forces providing combat stability to strategic
missile-carrying submarines is the assumption that the Soviets
obviously expect them to the attacked during war.
Despite these asymmetries, nuclear-capable nations could
feel relatively secure that no matter what happened during the
conventional phase of war, or despite the use of some of one's
own missiles in initial nuclear strikes, "sufficient" nuclear
forces would remain to credibly threaten an enemy with an
unacceptable response. No nation would likely be forced into
considering its sea-based nuclear force should be used early in a
war because they might be lost to conventional combat actions
against it.
Many in the West feel that offensive operations should not
be taken against Soviet missile submarines during the
conventional phase of a war, since it would automatically trigger
vertical escalation because the USSR would rather use than lose
them. Implicit in that argument is the assumption that Soviet
naval submarines with missiles constitute the nuclear reserve of
the Soviet military - the force that threatens the West with
retribution no matter what happens to the other two legs of the
triad.
I doubt that the Soviet military could ever allow one
service, especially Navy which is ranked fifth among the Soviet
military services, to maintain the only reserve of nuclear forces
and, therefore, to be the decisive branch of combat arms in a
war. Soviet military strategy is a combined-arms approach to
warfare in which all major branches are given a role influencing
the "outcome" of the war.
The Soviet Union has more land-based missile and bomber
forces than the West feels it needs, even if Soviet analysts
assume that the West would strike first. If the West were to
strike first, there are simply not enough weapons to disarm the
Soviet military. Therefore, some land-based missile and bomber
forces must be included in reserve forces as well. There is no
evidence in Soviet military literature that either the Navy or
sea-based nuclear systems will be the force that directly
influences the outcome of a war. It would be decidedly non-
Russian to allow the navy to field the only nuclear reserve.
Another problem with viewing Soviet missile-carrying
submarines as only a nuclear reserve is that older and shorter-
range missiles deployed off the coasts of enemy nations can
9perform unigue damage limitation missions. For example, Soviet
SS-N-6 Serb missiles aboard Yankee submarines can strike U.S.
Strategic Air Command bases or vital command, control, and
communications facilities much more quickly than can intercon-
tinental missiles launched from the USSR, or from protected
bastions. Such missions are consistent with Soviet military
strategy and tasks given to the Soviet Navy.
Some of these sea-based systems deployed in theater oceanic
areas also allow the Soviets to circumvent the loss of SS-20
Saber missiles, dismantled by the new INF Treaty. Indeed, the
recent repositioning of Yankee submarines from the North American
coasts to theater waters not only suggests that they served a
role not associated with a nuclear reserve but provides more
evidence that the Soviet military has not given up its preferred
strategies for war fighting thus ensuring that they can dominate
the nuclear escalation decision. As the Soviet Navy deploys
hard-target capable warheads, it is likely that the number of
submarines assigned to first strike missions will increase.
Fortunately, when the Soviet Union deploys its submarines
outside protected bastions, it moves them closer to enemy
antisubmarine warfare forces. Because then, of military utility
and lack of survivability, it is likely that some sea-based
systems have a role in a first nuclear strike, rather than only
as a part of the strategic nuclear reserve.
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If these short-range sea-based systems deployed within
striking range of Canada, Japan, China, and Korea were a part of
a secure nuclear reserve, the Soviets should have withdrawn them
to protected home waters, such as the Sea of Okhotsk, where they
could present a subsequent escalatory threat if surge-deployed
close to enemy shores. Instead, by siting them in relatively
exposed forward areas, we must conclude that they are designed to
be used as part of a combined arms attack in the event of war, or
that the Soviets have a high regard for their survivability. It
could also mean that they serve only a pre-war political role and
are either expendable in combat, or would be repositioned.
Another theory suggested is that the USSR intends to hide
these units in the territorial - and perhaps internal - waters of
other nations. Although originally suggested with regard to
the Baltic, is this option present in Japanese waters or the
Canadian far north? It would certainly present unique challenges.
For example, what should be the Canadian response if it again
detected a Soviet submarine near its shores—this time a missile-
carrying submarine in Arctic territorial waters during a NATO
crisis not directly involving Canada? Does the response change
if a NATO/Warsaw Pact war is raging in Europe but the submarine
is in Canada's Pacific 200-mile fisheries zone?
From 1970 until his replacement in 1985 as Commander-in-
Chief of the Soviet Navy, the late Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov described U.S. aircraft carriers as
being a portion of the reserve of strategic nuclear forces.
There has never been any consideration in Soviet military
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strategy, military art, naval operational art, or naval tactics
to withhold attacks against aircraft carriers because they might
constitute a portion of our nuclear reserve.
Despite the large portion of Western missile submarines
deployed in the deep ocean expanse, and that some or even most of
these carry warheads for the Western nuclear reserve force,
Soviet military spokesmen have openly stated that the destruction
of enemy sea-based nuclear assets is a strategic goal for them
12
and a main mission of the Soviet navy in any future war. Such
statements, coupled with aggressive antisubmarine warfare
programs and other actions taken to reduce further homeland
vulnerability to attack, reinforce the conclusion that the USSR
has never accepted the theory of assured vulnerability reguired
by mutual assured destruction. Fortunately for the West, Soviet
antisubmarine warfare capabilities have never matched their
aspirations.
Essentially, to the Soviet military, it is far better to
strike an enemy submarine in the conventional phase of a war, and
destroy perhaps hundreds of warheads before they launch, than
allow that threat to exist. The destruction of even one Ohio
class ballistic missile submarine armed with Trident C-4 missiles
might cause the loss of 192 nuclear warheads. This damage
limitation mission is totally in conformance with Soviet military
strategy for deterrence.
The Soviet theory is that, the capability to alter the
correlation of forces by sinking enemy strategic missile-carrying
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submarines on the high seas during the conventional phase of a
war will both prevent nuclear escalation in the event of war and
limit damage to the Soviet homeland if the war turns nuclear.
There is no literature demonstrating Soviet fear that nuclear
escalation might result from such operations; they apparently do
not anticipate that the the U.S. - or any enemy nation - would
initiate nuclear war over the loss of strategic missile-carrying
submarines during the conventional phase of a war. The single
combined armed military strategy includes a role for ground
forces to take out NATO land-based nuclear forces and thus
prevent escalation.
Consider, for example, the following recent Soviet military
statements regarding attacking an enemy's nuclear forces during
the conventional phase of a war. Why should we assume that
naval operational art is any different?
"The destruction of the nuclear attack weapons and the
maximum weakening of the enemy's nuclear might have come to hold
the central place in the fight for fire supremacy. It is felt
that the enemy nuclear attack weapons must be combated continuou-
sly and with all weapons."
"Of enormous significance is the primary hitting of enemy
nuclear missile weapons and high precision weapons even before
the moving up of the main grouping of one's troops into the jump-
off areas for the offensive and for launching counterstrikes.
"
"The following have become the most important of the Army's
missions: destroying the enemy's operational-tactical nuclear
strike weapons. . .The first operational echelon in key sectors was
also to include tank formations, which were to be used for a
guick advance into the enemy's depth of position, for destroying
his nuclear strike weapons in coordination with assault forces,
etc."
NATO and U.S. declaratory maritime strategies have long
included the possibility of offensive action against Soviet
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strategic missile-carrying submarines during the conventional
1 fi
phase of war. The reasons are essentially those espoused by
the Soviets. A strong and additional side benefit to NATO is that
if the Soviets are engaged in defending their bastions, only
minimal residual forces may be available for open-ocean strikes
against vital allied sealines of communication. This relation-
ship, between fighting in bastions and the residual forces left
over for defense/attack of open ocean sealines of communication
is generally expressed in terms of North Atlantic scenarios; not
Pacific.
Whether an enemy submarine carries nuclear or conventional
munitions, a prudent assumption military planners should make
before a war is that any enemy submarine found off one's shores
is a potential threat that must be neutralized in the event of
armed conflict with that enemy. Forward-based submarines are
prime targets for enemy navies, since they represent not only a
first strike nuclear threat but also provide vital attack asses-
sment and other intelligence information—and, because they
present a conventional torpedo and missile capability.
Additionally, every submarine sunk during the initial stages of a
war is one less that can be re-used if reloaded. Most nations
have the necessary antisubmarine forces to deal with Soviet
intruders close to their shores.
Actually attacking a missile-carrying submarine is a far
more difficult task than generally credited by civilian analysts
and academics unfamiliar with salt water antisubmarine warfare
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operations. One must assume, however, that submarines deployed
near an enemy's main antisubmarine forces are more likely to be
destroyed than those trying to avoid them.
Attacking enemy missile-carrying submarines in defended
bastions, however, is much more difficult and will undoubtedly
involve a high cost. Yet if the benefits of such actions are
substantial, one must assess the relation of benefits to costs.
For example, if France or China took every possible precaution to
ensure the survival of their sea-based nuclear forces during the
conventional phase of a war, but the Soviets could destroy them
anyway, then France or China might not have any nuclear "cards"
left to play at war termination—and, therefore, might not
participate. Such a major political result might be worth the
cost of a few, albeit high cost, Soviet antisubmarine warfare
units.
Posing such a strategic antisubmarine warfare capability
does not necessarily undermine deterrence but rather parallels it
by reinforcing the belief that deterrence is best served by a
credible capability to prevent an enemy from achieving his own
war aims. The U.S. understands that to deter the Soviets , the
West must present a capability that evidence shows that the
Soviets respect. A credible capability to limit damage to its
homeland by attacking nuclear weapons delivery vehicles during
the conventional phase of a war is a principle that the Soviet
military has advanced for years and, conforms totally with the
Soviet philosophy of deterrence.
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In a war, attacking an enemy force before it attacks you is
17
militarily sound. Attacking enemy nuclear-capable forces--
especially forward deployed units capable of time-urgent strikes
against critical forces—also makes good military sense. The
numbers of strategic missile-carrying submarines of all types on
forward deployments or in bastions as well as air-breathing and
land-based weapons systems, in the Soviet inventory make it
unlikely that the West could ever destroy sufficient numbers to
deplete the Soviet strategic nuclear reserve.
This view is shared by the authors of two recent Western
18
studies and also apparently by Marshal Ogarkov. Ogarkov has
written extensively over the past few years that it is impossible
19to destroy all of either superpower's means of nuclear attack.
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, the new Chief of the
20General Staff, echoed this theme recently in an article. If
the Soviet military does not view a disarming first strike
possible, then they must view their total nuclear reserve as
being secure, even under the worst case scenario.
The loss of a submarine at sea is not likely to "require" a
nation's political leadership to seek overwhelming retribution
through nuclear escalation. Conversely, opportunities to reduce
enemy nuclear forces in the event of war should be seized, even
if results are likely to be modest and require some extended
period of time to achieve. Soviet missile-carrying submarines
should not be listed as targets that require authorization to
attack, once armed conflict commences. The Soviet military has
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stated repeatedly that they will attempt to attack enemy missile
submarines during a war; we should attack theirs.
Every submarine destroyed reduces the number of warheads
whose use could be threatened by the Soviet Union during the
conventional phase, or would be used in nuclear combat
operations, or could be threatened/used during the termination
phase of the war. Even the threat of such actions will cause the
Soviets to consider defending their missile submarines in
bastions and is likely to influence the numbers of submarines
left over for attacks on the distant sealines of communications.
It is unlikely that any nation will make the political
decision to escalate to nuclear warfare for actions taken against
its fleet at sea, even if units damaged or sunk are strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles. No matter how much we talk before war
about avoiding actions that might risk military reaction, in war,
political leaders will demand options from their military for
actions to create as favorable terms of war termination as can be
achieved. Altering the nuclear correlation of forces by
attacking an enemy's submarines is the type of step that might
lead to war termination before vertical escalation or might not
lead to vertical escalation at all.
II
A major issue now being raised is that, with improvements in
technology, the Soviets might elect to send the majority of their
strategic missile-carrying submarines and additional fleet units
into the deep oceans in the event of a crisis, or war, instead of
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keeping them in bastions--a Soviet version of the U.S. Maritime
Strategy. We can debate Soviet future intentions forever, but a
few things should be kept in mind. First, under combined arms
warfare, there will never be a Soviet Maritime Strategy—only one
combined military strategy with naval operational art and
tactical components. Second, the Soviet Navy is not a first rate
power projection Navy capable of conducting distant water major
fleet operations in high risk environments. The size, however,
of the Soviet Pacific Fleet gives all Pacific nations cause for
alarm. One hopes that the new "defensive" military doctrine and
the standard of "reasonable sufficiency" will cause the USSR to
reduce its commitment to military growth in the region.
Another Soviet option is to deploy submarines in restricted
waters, so for geographic, military, political, and legal
reasons, other nations would find it more difficult to conduct
offensive antisubmarine warfare operations. Tom Clancy raised
such a possibility in his fictional Red Storm Rising , when Soviet
strategic missile submarines deployed in the White Sea, portions
of which are acknowledged internal waters of the Soviet Union.
Are there other areas in which nations might want to hide
their strategic missile-carrying submarines? An examination of
the ocean areas of the Pacific or Arctic might reveal some
alternatives to open-ocean or bastion deployment. We should
remember that if sea-based nuclear forces primarily constitute a
part of national nuclear reserves, there is no requirement that
these submarines routinely patrol within missile range of their
assigned North American targets. Deploying submarines in
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restricted waters close to shore offers the Soviet Union
opportunities to hide submarines, atone for deficiencies in sub-
marine and antisubmarine warfare technology, and concurrently
keep all Pacific targets covered.
Additional political and legal implications regarding these
type deployments would certainly affect both Soviet and Western
decision-making. For example, should nations conduct offensive
naval operations in or near enemy/other nation's home waters,
namely exclusive economic zones, fishery zones, territorial or
internal waters, during the initial conventional phase of war?
Should operations be conducted in an enemy's home waters, in a
different theater of operations during a limited or general war,
when actions thus far were confined to another distant theater;
Pacific operations when the war is generally limited to the
Atlantic or Southwest Asia?
This type of scenario becomes even more interesting if we
consider that some of these waters are viewed by the U.S. as
subject to high seas rights of navigation yet are now or in the
past have been considered in some cases by Soviet writers, and in
a few instances officially, as closed seas, historic, regional,
or territorial bays or seas, or internal waters. For example, the
Sea of Okhotsk has been referred to by Soviet writers, but never
officially, as a "closed sea." Similarly, some writers have
described the Sea of Japan as a "regional sea" to which access
would be unrestricted only in peacetime. Both seas are
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acknowledged as areas for Soviet ballistic missile submarine
deployments.
Perhaps the most significant official claim is to Peter the
Great Bay, off Vladivostok, as historic and thus internal waters,
enclosed by a baseline of 106.3 nautical miles! I use the term
significant since all nations acknowledge the legal restrictions
on sailing in another nation's internal waters during peacetime
and no nation accepts such a lengthy baseline. The 106 nautical
mile line which the Soviets claim closes off Peter the Great Bay
is, at one point, more than twenty miles from any land.
Some Soviet writers have taken the position that the Chukchi
Sea, in the Arctic, is a "territorial bay." A similar principle,
the "historic bay," is recognized in the West with Canada's
Hudson Bay and Strait, and the U.S. Monterey Bay as examples.
Whether or not the Sea of Okhotsk is a "closed sea," or the
Chukchi Sea is a "territorial bay," or the legal significance of
such statements, it is clear that all nations attach more impor-
tance to areas of the ocean close to its shores than they do to
the high seas.
Japan has stated its intention to conduct maritime
operations out to distances of 1000 n.m. from its shores. What
is the reaction of the Soviet military to such statements since
the expected zone of Soviet sea-denial operations includes most
of those same waters? The Sea of Japan and critical straits of
egress are obvious areas of military operations for Soviet
military and maritime assets during a war. What will the
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Japanese response be if one of its merchants or warships is sunk
on the high seas in a war? Does the response change if that ship
is sunk within this 1000 n.m. zone of interest? Or within
Japanese territorial waters.
Might Japanese self-defense measures upset the USSR, such
as Japan mining its own territorial waters during a superpower
crisis? What would the Soviet reaction be if mines planted in
Japan's territorial waters then broke free and damaged a Soviet
ship in one of the straits where transit passage is guaranteed?
Remember the different reaction of the world's maritime nations
to Iranian mines in Persian Gulf international waters as
differentiated by mines found in territorial waters.
We know that nations react when other nations sail their
warships within "territorial waters," despite the internationally
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recognized right of innocent passage. Nations will very likely
react to attacks within its internal or territorial waters,
closed, historic, regional, or territorial bays or seas in a
different manner than to attack forward-deployed units on the
high seas. Nations will similarly react differently if other
nations remain in these waters for extended periods of time or
conduct combat therein during wartime.
These geographic, military, political, and legal
ramifications illustrate the ratchet effect possible through
horizontal escalation at sea. Unique escalatory steps can be
taken at sea to send clear political signals to other nations
without resorting to vertical escalation and nuclear war.
21
Horizontal escalation has a number of maritime "rungs" that must
be thoroughly investigated by naval and political leaders and
planners, and understood by those who otherwise criticize such
plans. It appears that the Chief of the General Staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces and the First Deputy Defense Minister agrees
with the concept of horizontal escalation: "...despite the claims
of Western politicians and strategists, major military clashes




There are many opportunities to analyze horizontal escala-
tion options in the Pacific region and specific actions that can
be taken to make definite political statements by navies. The
point is that there are many options besides vertical escalation
to nuclear war. The most common issue raised is whether or not
navies should engage each other in the Pacific if the war
originates in Europe. Is it realistic to expect them to continue
normal peacetime behavior—rendering honors when they pass?
Ill
Additional political and legal aspects of strategic ASW have
been raised, with suggestions that arms controls regulate such
potential operations. Proposals to restrict deployments of
strategic missile-carrying submarines and concommitant limita-
tions on antisubmarine warfare have been around for years,
attracting former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. More recently,
these ideas have been again raised by Soviet Communist Party
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in his October 1987 speech in
Murmansk.
22
Most of these proposals would create "safe" zones for the
deployment of strategic missile-carrying submarines. Within them,
all antisubmarine warfare operations would be restricted. Other
proposals include limits on strategic antisubmarine warfare or
its technological development. "Safe" zones would restrict
operations my virtually all warships, hydrographic vessels, or
naval auxiliaries from vast areas of the high seas since it could
be argued that even routine transit would result in the conduct
of some phase of antisubmarine warfare (visual search at a
minimum) or related antisubmarine warfare research (fathometer
soundings at a minimum) . Would we then need to restrict fishing
vessels and merchant ships since these would also be conducting
visual searches and soundings on bottom depth?
Even if one could verify compliance with such measures, the
net effect would be more beneficial for the Soviet Union than for
the West. In effect, such an arms control regime would reguire
the West to identify the areas of the ocean in which its
strategic missile-carrying submarines deploy. The latter would
be a major contribution to the solution of the Soviets' antisub-
marine warfare search problem and a major threat that would
weaken Western deterrence—including the deterrent umbrella
extended over non-nuclear allies.
With the U.S. decision to reduce the number of its strategic
missile-carrying submarines to significantly fewer numbers than
those permitted under SALT I, it should be in all allies
interests to see the Soviet's search problem kept as complicated
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as possible—as a hedge against a possible breakthrough in anti-
submarine warfare.
A reduction in the number of ballistic missile submarine
hulls under a future START agreement has three possible
implications that should be kept in mind. First, substantially
reducing the number of aim points for strategic antisubmarine
efforts is a problem that must be constantly monitored by
government intelligence agencies charged with assessing enemy
antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Second, if the number of
I
their ballistic missile submarines is reduced, it is likely that
the Soviet Navy will have additional surplus general purpose
forces that it could send into the expanses of the Pacific Ocean
in time of war. Third, any future arms control agreement that
involves nuclear weapons should not grant the USSR a unilateral
advantage in the number of ballistic missile submarine hulls nor
exclude the diesel-electric ballistic missile submarines and
intermediate-range naval land-based nuclear cruise missile
23forces that are now found in the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Arms control limitations on antisubmarine warfare would
significantly reduce current opportunities for gathering
intelligence, a part of our national technical means of
verification of existing arms control agreements. Analyzing such
a possible arms control regime, verification problems abound.
For example, if the West wanted to demonstrate that the Soviet
Union was not complying with such an antisubmarine warfare
agreement, but could do so only by exposing sophisticated
technical or intelligence capabilities, then it would be forced
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to chose between exposing the non-compliance and the related
intelligence source or not publicizing the violation. Similar
problems exist when a nation must decide if it will expose
violation of territorial seas or other sensitive waters.
Attempting to regulate strategic antisubmarine warfare
technology without similar restrictions on operational or
tactical antisubmarine warfare technology is obviously neither
practical nor in the best interests of NATO nations. If
successful NATO defense strategy continues to depend upon the
reinforcement/resupply of Europe from North America in the event
of conventional war, then the allies will reguire advanced anti-
submarine warfare technigues to get the convoys through. The
Warsaw Pact can fight in Europe without relying on vulnerable
sealines of communication and might therefore be in a better
position to absorb antisubmarine warfare technology restrictions.
The West cannot afford to gamble on surrendering its lead in
antisubmarine warfare technology by agreeing to any restrictions
in a future arms control regime. For an antisubmarine warfare
arms control agreement to be meaningful, it would have to be
accompanied by a comprehensive regime regulating virtually all
nuclear and non-nuclear forces and activities.
Other naval arms control proposals suggested by the USSR
include restricting major maritime exercises in the Pacific to
one or two each year. This may be a satisfactory situation for
continental powers like the Soviet Union but would clearly be
insufficient for seapowers like the United States or Japan.
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Soviet proposals for zones of peace or nuclear free zones at
sea seek to undermine the NATO strategy of flexible response;
i.e. the allies currently have options other than conventional
defeat or immediate escalation to a major nuclear war. Retaining
the full spectrum of war fighting options with its fleets is in
the best interests of the NATO alliance.
It is fitting to consider the relationship of the outstan-
ding climate for international relations that exists between the
United States and Canada to the type of arms control agreements
that exist between our two nations. Did the Rush-Bagot Treaty of
1817 cause or start these good relations? Is the absence of any
major arms control agreements between the U.S. and Canada,
instead, indicative of the fact that nations need to resolve
their substantive economic and political differences instead of
using arms control as a surrogate for doing so?
The point of arms control is not simply to sign treaties.
The true measures of worthwhile arms control agreements are if
they: (1) reduce the likelihood of war, or (2) reduce the
consequences of war, or (3) reduce costs. Arms control measures
should not be taken in isolation but rather in a integrated
fashion with national security policy and in conjunction with
allies.
IV
Discussions of scenarios of nuclear escalation dominance and
vulnerability should do more than focus on vertical escalation
and the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. Nations of the Pacific
region have a much richer agenda of topics for discussion than
j
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those. We must understand those two topics for certain but there
is a much broader range of issues to be considered.
The classic question under consideration is what political-
military actions should be taken by Pacific states, or in the
Pacific region, during a global war between the superpowers,
which originated in Europe. Although that scenario is the least
likely to occur, it still forms the basis for discussion and
factors into programming and war planning. There are fundamental
questions yet to be answered, such as: (1) do Pacific forces
belonging to the superpowers or Canada remain in the Pacific or
transfer to other theaters of operations in the event of a war
originating outside the Pacific; (2) will the superpowers and
their allies fight on the strategic offensive or strategic
defensive in the Pacific if the war originates in another
theater; or, (3) what type actions should be planned for
against/in defense of superpower allies? This latter question
directly involves actions that might be taken against the Soviet
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overseas base in Vietnam.
Additional planning scenarios might include a superpower war
with that war originating in the Pacific instead of Europe or
Southwest Asia. Is such a war realistic or not? Could such a
war be successfully fought without allies? To decide on answers
to these questions, planners are forced to consider such
scenarios and to flesh them out and subject them to simulations,
gaming, and hard analysis.
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Doing so does not mean that strawman scenarios will result
in specific war plans nor such operations at the time of
execution- For example, just because the Soviets actually have
nuclear weapons in Europe and have an offensive military
strategy, it does not follow that they will attack tomorrow with
nuclear weapons nor use such weapons during the initial period of
an armed conflict.
For years, the West has manipulated the USSR with an
implicit threat of conventional attack against its homeland in
the event of a war. One can speculate on the effect of a few
conventional sea-launched cruise missiles on the populations of
Japan, Australia, Canada, or the U.S., even if those weapons were
employed only against military targets in coastal regions. Why,
however, should we assume that warheads will be nuclear?
Escalation should not be viewed as having only a vertical
component leading automatically to global nuclear war. There are
significant military actions including those taken by navies,
that can escalate warfare by expanding the confrontation to new
geographic areas or by extending the conflict over time. Both,
construed as actions taken to "prevent" enemy victory, or at
least to "punish" aggression, fit well into normal deterrence
theory. Retribution for attack need not take the form of nuclear
strikes— indeed today Canada has no means of direct nuclear
retaliation against the Soviet Union but makes its contribution
to allied nuclear efforts via non-nuclear actions and apparently
is prepared to contribute to allied efforts to fight in theaters
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of operations outside of Europe.
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These dimensions of escalation must be considered since the
Pacific region weighs heavily in both. For example, the Soviets
"swung" Pacific fleet forces to Europe during the Great Patriotic
War; will they do so again in a future war? Will either
superpower assume the offensive in the Pacific even if the war
2 8
starts in another theater? The West considers its ability to
sustain war in Europe or Southwest Asia in terms of resupply of
spare parts, etc. that it normally receives from Pacific nations;
not just in terms of sending material and oil from North America
to the primary theater of land warfare. Similarly, the West
considers the sustainability of Soviet European warfighting
campaigns in terms of resources to be transferred from its
Pacific region to Europe. The role of navies in these types of
scenarios should be obvious.
Perhaps the most likely scenarios to be considered should be
developed by regional experts: what likely crises could evolve
between the superpowers over the next few years? What are the
likely roles of major regional actors in such crises? Would any
of these crises lead to armed conflict? Will the new
international law of the sea regime lead to additional
confrontations between Pacific states and is it possible that the
superpowers may be involved or drawn into these crises? What is
the likelihood of nuclear coercion by any nuclear power in a non-
nuclear crisis? Is it possible to take bold conventional actions
during a crisis or war without strategic nuclear superiority and
the ability to dominate the vertical escalation question? Does
extended deterrence really depend upon nuclear balances or more
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upon the conventional forces immediately available in a crisis
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area? Does extended deterrence extend to naval forces?
Some very interesting scenarios have already been well
discussed in the literature and do not need to be repeated here
in detail. There are obvious needs for improved Canadian-U.S.
cooperation in the area of intelligence and warning due to
improved Soviet ballistic and cruise missile capabilities.
Pacific nations at least need to consider their reactions to
continued Soviet testing of land-based ballistic missiles and
impacting in the vicinity of populated islands. Advanced
notification of such missile tests is a needed confidence
building measure. Similarly, incursions of Soviet submarines in
and around the Straits of Juan de Fuca resulted in a joint U.S.-
Canadian agreements for naval cooperation.
Developing or programmed forces also suggest some additional
scenarios that have been discussed in the literature. The
American strategic defense initiative (SDI) led to a great deal
of debate over the role of Canada in such a system. Absent from
many of those discussions was the role that navies might play as
a part of that initiative—especially in the Pacific. This is a
topic for which we especially like to have access to the Soviet
internal literature. Since we already know that the Soviet
"defensive" military doctrine includes strategic defenses and a
defense of the homeland mission for their navy, it would be
interesting to see how the Soviets intend to integrate their
fleet into more advanced concepts of ballistic missile defense.
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Despite the fact that neither SDI , nor its parallel air
defense initiative, nor the new fleet of Canadian nuclear-powered
submarines are even close to reality, we already have seen
numerous articles dealing with expanding U.S. -Canadian military
cooperation to other areas. Before we get into the details of
expanding cooperation on the NORAD model we should first agree
upon concepts of operations. Within the context of these
alternative futures then, naval planners should outline the role
of the militaries in general—and navies in specific and develop
such concepts of operations. Planning should not be done from
the bottom up; instead the national leaders involved should first
outline some basic political terms of reference and then task
their military staffs to flesh out concepts of operations and
force reguirements in a dynamic iterative process.
Creative scenarios are a good source of heuristic inputs for
real and detailed political-military analysis or for games and
simulations that are inputs to the planning process. Scenarios
have no intrinsic value; their worth is based upon how well they
serve to stimulate thought or allow successful completion of a
simulation or game and thus improve planning.
At a minimum, the USSR ought to help the West better under-
stand its military doctrine and strategy. If it really is based
upon such war-fighting concepts as damage limitation and
offensive first strike operations, the proper response is to deal
with the Soviets as they see themselves, not in some
theoretically "rational" manner that makes good sense to a
Western academic. As much as we would like to see military
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vulnerability accepted in the USSR so that we could then decide
that "MAD" did describe the state cf the world, it is up to the
Soviets to demonstrate in both deed and word that their past
behavior and policies have now changed.
Each superpower needs to recognize that what appears to
themselves as a logical deterrent posture can appear to be very
threatening to the other side. Existing Soviet land-based hard
target kill capable ballistic missiles, an extremely robust
defense against air-breathing systems, a commitment to strategic
defenses, and an aggressive antisubmarine warfare research and
development program coupled with existing Soviet declaratory
military strategy look very much like an attempt to capture
overall military superiority rather than merely providing a
"sufficient" defense.
There are probably some modest arms control measures that
can be pursued even now; measures clearly on the margin and not
involving central systems. Unilateral actions, not mere words,
to reduce excessive Soviet military capability and overseas
deployments would be welcomed as significant confidence building
measures. An agreement on notification of additional ballistic
missile tests has just been signed. The existing bilateral
incidents at sea agreement and high level meetings between the
military staffs of each superpower appear to be constructive
measures to minimize the potential for crises arising out of
everyday operations and maximizing communications at a
professional level.
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I doubt whether it is wise to or if we can even separate out
the Pacific as a region nor naval operations as a function that
can be regulated by some new arms control measures in the absence
of a comprehensive global arms control regime. It is the
author's opinions that the current or projected situation in the
Pacific region is not so severe that immediate arms control is
needed. The two superpowers are adjusting to new technological
opportunities and political realities and need time to come to a
mutual understanding. The active participation of allied and
neighboring nations will always be welcome.
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